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Abstract
The paper presents an endogenous growth economy with a repre-
sentation of the tax rate system in the Baltic countries. Assuming
that government spending is a given fraction of output, the paper
shows how a at tax system balanced between labor and corporate
tax rates can be second best optimal. It then computes how actual
Baltic tax reforms from 2000 to 2007 a¤ect the growth rate and wel-
fare, including transition dynamics. Comparing the actual reform
e¤ects to hypothetical tax experiments, it results that equal at tax
rates on personal and corporate income would have increased welfare
in all three Baltic countries by 24% more on average than the actual
reforms. This shows how equal, balanced, at rate taxes can be opti-
mal in both theory and practice. Further, movement towards a more
equal balance between labor and capital tax rates, through changing
just one tax rate, achieved almost as high or higher utility gains as in
actual law for all three countries under both open and closed economy
cases. This shows benets of moving towards the optimum.
JEL: E13, H20, O11, O14
Keywords: tax reform, endogenous growth, transitional dynamics,
at taxes
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1 Introduction
The theoretically optimal capital tax in a second-best setting is to build
up revenue by initially taxing capital at high rates and then decreasing the
capital tax to zero in the long run (Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2000). But
in practice, there is not an obvious international trend towards zero capital
tax rates, and an initial build-up of taxes does not appear to have been
documented. What we do see is that the level of tax rates on both capital
and labor have trended down over time; and perhaps they have become more
balanced. For example in 1952 the US tax rate for the top-bracket of
personal income was 92% and the top-bracket corporate income tax was 52%
and now both of these are 35%.
However, evidence is more extensive for movements towards low at taxes,
which has been called The Global Flat Tax Revolution(Mitchell, 2007). A
at tax can refer to a single tax rate bracket on either personal or corporate
income; there are many countries with a single tax bracket for each personal
and corporate income tax rates; in some countries there are equal at tax
rates on both personal and corporate income (Romania- 16%; Serbia- 14%);
and one at least even has equal rates on personal, corporate and on the
value-added tax (Slovakia- 19%).
There are good reasons for these at regimes in terms of the benets of
tax simplication for these systems, and for low tax rates in terms of de-
creasing the tax-induced disincentive to work, accumulate capital, and sell
goods. It remains unclear however whether more balanced at rate systems
are better than more unbalanced ones. For example, the Baltic countries
have low personal income tax rates but even lower corporate tax rates. And
in contrast, Russia, Ukraine and Georgia have low at corporate tax rates
(24%) but even lower at personal income tax rates (13%). One motivation
for balanced personal and corporate rates is that tax evasion devices exist
whereby the higher tax rate can be avoided in favor of the lower tax rate: for
example the personal income tax rate can be evaded when company employ-
ees become self-employed consultants so that their labor income is subject
to the corporate tax rate rather than the personal tax rate.
But putting aside the incentive to evade taxes, this paper focuses on even
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more basic reasons for balanced at rate tax systems to be preferred in terms
of the optimum welfare of the economy. In particular, an economy is pre-
sented in which the zero second-best optimal capital tax rate is replaced by a
possible second-best optimum of balanced labor and capital tax rates. This
results by assuming as in Barro (1990), Turnovsky (2000) and Funke and
Strulik (2006) that government spending is a constant fraction of income,
rather than exogenous and independent of income. The equal rate at tax
optimum combines the insight of Barro that a single at tax income rate is
equal to the government expenditure share and the extension in Turnovsky
that with both labor and capital taxes, the equal at rate on each tax is
equal to the government expenditure share. This assumes zero benets of
non-transfer government spending. Applying this model to the Baltic coun-
tries, by developing a detailed model of the economy and its tax system, the
optimum is derived and then the e¤ects of actual tax reforms experienced
from 2000 to 2007 are examined in light of the optimum. The details of
the economy also allow for extension of the second-best optimum such that
a "composite labor tax", which includes social security and VAT taxes, is
equal to the corporate income tax rate and the government spending share.
The Baltic tax reforms started in 1994 in Estonia, and by 2000 the average
Baltic personal tax rates had fallen to 28% and average corporate tax rates
to 16%. By 2007, the average Baltic tax rates had fallen further: to 25% for
personal tax rates and to 10% for corporate tax rates. It emerges from the
model that this tax regime is not well-balanced in that it is sub-optimally
weighted towards higher labor taxes. Intuitively, the economy has a central
feature that the return on human capital is equal to the return on physical
capital along the balanced growth path, and this in part gives rise to the
desirability of balancing composite labor and corporate tax rates.
After setting up the economy (Section 2), the paper next presents the
social planner problem (Section 3). It then calibrates a baseline initially-
closed economy model for each of the three Baltic countries (Section 4) and
estimates the maximum possible utility gains from tax reform (Section 5.1)
and the actual estimated utility gains from the 2000-2007 reforms (Section
5.2). For Latvia and Lithuania, it is shown that using only equal at taxes,
on personal and corporate income, to raise the same revenues as were raised
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under the 2007 tax law would have been better than the actual tax reforms
instituted by 2007. And again raising the same amount of revenue as in 2007,
but by changing just one tax, it is shown that lowering the personal income
tax, or social security contributions, moves the countries towards more bal-
ancedtax rates and raises welfare by more than did the actual reforms in all
three countries (Section 5.3). Under open economy assumptions the order-
ing of the benets from changing individual taxes is preserved, although the
benet of the reforms from 2000 to 2007 becomes smaller and actually turns
negative for two of the Baltic countries (Section 6). Also it is shown how
the improvement in welfare from changing individual tax rates depends upon
the initial set of tax rates; this helps explain how seemingly contradictory
results from other studies for the ranking of tax reforms can be explained by
di¤erent initial sets of tax rates (Section 7).
Under both closed and open economy assumptions and starting from the
2000 law, the paper concludes that moving towards more balanced at taxes,
in terms of the labor tax versus the corporate income tax, improves welfare in
the Baltic countries. The puzzle of the international movement towards at
and equal taxes rather than zero corporate taxes is partly addressed by this
type of result. But also, as the optimum allows for lower personal tax rates
than corporate tax rates when there are other taxes on social security and
goods purchases, this analysis better rationalizes the Russia-Ukraine-Georgia
case than those countries with relatively low corporate tax rates (Section 8).
2 The Endogenous Growth Economy
The endogenous growth model shares common elements with Kim (1998) and
Devereux and Love (1994). As in Kim (1998), the paper introduces a realistic
tax system while the specication of preferences and technology resembles
that of Devereux and Love (1994). A corporate sector, as the representative
rm, is introduced following Turnovsky (1995, Chapters 10 and 11), so as to
account for di¤erent types of corporate income and dividend tax treatment.
We assume that there are no new equity issues, that investment is nanced
by retained earnings, and that the remaining income is distributed as divi-
dends. Also, as in Kim, we account for the added complexity of the di¤erence
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between the actual depreciation rate and the accounting depreciate rate. The
most closely related paper in terms of the study of tax reform in the Baltic
countries is Funke and Struliks (2006) interesting analysis of Estonias 2000
tax reform. Although that paper assumes exogenous growth, while we use
endogenous growth, it includes the e¤ect of transitional dynamics on welfare
and includes a similar open economy analysis with a given world interest rate
as in our economy extension in Section 7.
2.1 The Consumer Problem
The representative consumers utility, with  > 0;   0 and  2 (0; 1),
depends at time t on consumption C and leisure time l:
U =
1X
t=0
t
(Ctl

t)
1 
1   : (1)
The consumer divides a time endowment of 1 between leisure, labour
supplied for goods production u, and time spent producing human capital in
a non-market sector z:
1 = lt + ut + zt: (2)
Following Lucas (1988), the consumer uses human capital indexed labour
for goods and human capital production. With human capital denoted by H,
its depreciation denoted by h, and Ah a constant productivity parameter,
its accumulation is governed by
Ht+1  Ht = AhztHt   hHt: (3)
The consumer derives income from the supply of labour to goods pro-
duction at the real wage rate of w for e¤ective, quality-indexed labour, the
holding of government bonds B, and the holding of corporate equity shares
E. Also the government provides a lump sum transfer T . The consumer
spends the income on consumption goods and the acquisition of additional
government bonds or corporate equity.
Taxes that the consumer faces are a personal income tax rate of  p that
falls on wage income, a social security tax rate of  sw that also falls on wage
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income, value added tax (VAT) rate of  v that falls on goods purchases,
a dividend tax rate of  d that falls on equity income, and a capital gains
tax rate of  g that falls on net price gains on equity sales. Government
bond income and government transfers are treated as tax exempt. With qt+1
the ex-dividend price on equities in period t with dividends paid starting in
period t+1, with rEt the equity dividend yield, and with rt the interest yield
on government bonds, the budget constraint is
(1   p)(1   sw)wtutHt + (1 + rt)Bt + (1   d)rEt qtEt + Tt (4)
=  g(qt+1   qt)Et + (1 +  v)Ct +Bt+1 + qt+1(Et+1   Et):
It will be convenient to denote by Dt  rEt qtEt the consumers dividends
that the corporate rm pays out.
Using the time constraint (2) to Substitute in lt = 1  ut   zt for leisure
in the utility function, the consumer maximizes utility (1) subject to (3) and
(4) with respect to Ct, ut, zt, Ht+1, Bt+1, and Et+1, taking prices, taxes and
the bond and dividend rate as given. Let t and t be Lagrangian multipliers
associated with the budget constraint (4) and human capital accumulation
function (3), respectively. First order conditions are:
C t l
(1 )
t = t(1 + 
v); (5)
C1 t l
(1 ) 1
t  = twt(1   sw)(1   p)Ht; (6)
C1 t l
(1 ) 1
t  = tAhHt; (7)
t = [t+1wt+1(1   sw)(1   p)ut+1 + t+1(Ahzt+1 + 1  h)]; (8)
t = t+1(1 + rt+1); (9)
tqt+1 = t+1[(1   d)rEt+1qt+1    g(qt+2   qt+1) + qt+2]: (10)
Combining (9) and (10) gives the arbitrage condition between bond and
equity returns:
rt = (1   d)rEt + (1   g)
qt+1   qt
qt
: (11)
Thus return on government bonds must be equal to after tax return from
dividend yield and capital gains.
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2.2 The Corporate Sector
The corporate rm problem follows Turnovsky (1995, Chapters 10 and 11).
Capital is stated in terms of the level of the usual economic capital K and in
terms of the accounting level of the capital stock Ka. These di¤erent stock
levels are necessary in order to introduce properly the statutory depreciation
rate , which causes the economic and accounting capital to be unequal if the
statutory depreciation rate di¤ers from the economic one k. The accounting
level of capital evolves according to
Kat+1 = (1  )Kat + It; (12)
while the economic capital is given by
Kt+1 = (1  k)Kt + It: (13)
Output Y is produced with Cobb-Douglas function in physical capital
and e¤ective labour; with  2 (0; 1)
Yt = AK

t (utHt)
1 : (14)
Given a social insurance tax paid by the rm on the wages, at the rate
of  se, the gross prots  are dened as
t = AK

t (utHt)
1    wt(1 +  se)utHt: (15)
With the corporate income tax given by  c, the prot net of taxes is (1  c)t.
Prots paid in taxes  ct can be decreased by two other factors. First,
there may exist an investment subsidy  s that adds  sI to prot in proportion
to the new investment (an investment tax credit). Second, taxable prots
are decreased by the depreciated amount of capital that adds  cKat to after-
tax prot. The net prot is used to pay out dividends D and to nance new
investment
(1   c)t +  sIt +  cKat = Dt + It: (16)
The specication of (16) assumes that investment is nanced only from
prots of the rm, and not by the issue of new equities. The latter is justied
by the under-developed nature of nancial markets in the Baltics, making
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equity nancing expensive. Only the initial equity issues are positive, and
then held constant over time, so that
E0 = ::: = Et = Et+1: (17)
This corresponds to the privatization programs and other forms of initial
public o¤erings, whereby additional equity o¤erings cannot be supported in
the market. The specication also rules out corporate bonds or bank credit.
Dene the value V of equities at a given time as
Vt  qtEt: (18)
Given the assumption (17), the arbitrage condition (11) gives the di¤erence
equation in the value of equities as
Vt+1 = Vt

1 +
rt
1   g

 

1   d
1   g

Dt: (19)
From (16) dividends equal
Dt = (1   c)t   (1   s)It +  cKat ; (20)
and the equation of motion for the value of the corporate rm, equation (19),
becomes
Vt+1 = Vt

1 +
rt
1   g

 

1   d
1   g

[(1   c)t  (1   s)It+  cKat ]: (21)
Equation (21) gives the result, by the coe¢ cient of Vt term, that the
cost of capital is independent of the dividend yield and the tax rate on
dividends. Solving the di¤erence equation (21) gives that the current value
of outstanding equities is equal to the present value of the discounted stream
of future cash ows;
V0 =

1   d
1   g
 1X
t=0
(1   c)t   (1   s)It +  cKatQt
j=0
 
1 +
rj
1 g
 : (22)
However, expression (22) is in terms of Ka, the accounting capital, while
the rm optimizes with respect to the economic capital K. Therefore Ka
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needs to be put in terms of K. Investment made at date t can be brought
together from the terms in (22) to give that the present value of tax sav-
ings from future depreciation of date t investment (see Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1980, Lecture 5)), as denoted by m, is equal to1
mt = 
c
1X
j=1
(1  )j 1Qj
i=1
 
1 + rt+i
1 g
 ; (23)
which has the recursive form of
mt =
 c
1 + rt+1
1 g
+
1  
1 + rt+1
1 g
mt+1:
Now the expression (22) can be rewritten, with substitution for  from
equation (15) and for I from equation (13), as
V0 =

1   d
1   g
 1X
t=0
tY
j=0
(1 +
rj
1   g )
 1 (1   c) AKt (utHt)1  (24)
 wt(1 +  se)utHt]  (1   s  mt) [Kt+1  Kt(1  k)] +  cKa0 (1  )t
	
:
The rm maximizes equation (24) with respect to capital Kt+1 and e¤ec-
tive labor ut to yield the rst-order conditions;
(1   s)

rt
1   g + k

+mt(   k)   c = (1   c)A

Kt
utHt
 1
; (25)
wt(1 + 
se) = (1  )A

Kt
utHt

: (26)
For example, with  g =  s =  = 0 the after tax input price ratio is
rt + k
wt(1 +  se)(1   c) =
a
1  
utHt
Kt
:
1Kim (1998) derives m in continuous time and in later analysis treats it as a constant.
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2.3 Government sector
The government receives income from taxes on consumption goods, labour
wage income to the consumer and labour wage payments by the rm, capital
gains, dividend payments, prots, and new bond issues. Expenditures are
for government spending  , interest payments and redemption of bonds, and
the lump sum transfer T . This implies the temporal government budget
constraint:
(1 + rt)Bt +  t + Tt (27)
= Bt+1 + 
vCt + [
sw + (1   sw) p +  se]wtutHt +  g(qt+1   qt)Et
+ drEt qtEt + 
c[AKt (utHt)
1    (1 +  se)wtutHt   Kat ]   sIt:
Transversality conditions also apply whereby as time tends to innity the
discounted value of each the bond and the equity holdings by agents, and
the capital stock held by rms, approaches zero.
It is assumed that government runs a balanced budget every period and
that there are no outstanding government bonds at date t = 0: B0 = 0. Then
the transfer each period is the di¤erence between government revenue and
expenditure. And it is assumed that government expenditure  t exogenously
grows at the rate of output growth gt for each t, so that  t=Yt is a given
constant  2 (0; 1) :
 t = Yt: (28)
2.4 Balanced-Growth Path Equilibrium
The balanced-growth path (BGP) equilibrium is derived from rst order con-
ditions (5)(9) and (25)(26), with the shares of time allocation for di¤erent
activities being stationary while the variables Y , C, K, I, H all grow at
common BGP growth rate, denoted by g. To solve for the equilibrium as a
single implicit equation in terms of only g; the ratios C
Y
and I
Y
are solved and
substituted into the social resource constraint
1 =
Ct
Yt
+
It
Yt
+
 t
Yt
: (29)
Dropping time subscripts, the time allocation and human capital accumu-
lation equations (2)-(3) imply that the growth rate is the following function
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of leisure l and work u:
g = Ah (1  l   u)  h: (30)
Using equations (6)-(9), the interest rate in terms of l is
r = Ah(1  l)  h; (31)
stating that the net return on physical capital equals the net return on human
capital. Equations (30)- (31) imply a leisure to work ratio of
l
u
=
Ah   h   r
r   g ; (32)
which is used now to solve for C
Y
: The marginal rate of substitution between
goods and leisure, from equations (5)-(6), is
C
l
=
(1   sw)(1   p)wH
1 +  v
: (33)
Solving for the wage rate from the output production function and the mar-
ginal product of labor condition, in equations (14) and (26), and substituting
this into equation (33) gives the ratio C
Y
in terms of l
u
:
C
Y
=
(1   sw)(1   p)
(1 +  se)(1 +  v)
(1  )

l
u
; (34)
and using the l
u
ratio of equation (32), C
Y
is then a function of g and r :
C
Y
=
(1   sw)(1   p)
(1 +  se)(1 +  v)

(1  )


Ah   h   r
r   g

: (35)
The ratio C
Y
is then solved as a function of g alone by solving for r as a
function of g from the Euler condition that results from equations (5) and
(9):
(1 + g) = (1 + r): (36)
Next the ratio I
Y
is solved by rst dividing the investment equation (13)
by Y :
I
Y
= (g + k)
K
Y
: (37)
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Simplifying the the steady state the expression for m in equation (23) to
m =
 c
r
1 g + 
; (38)
the capital to output ratio K
Y
is given by combining the output production
function and the marginal product of capital equations, (14) and (25):
(1   c)Y
K
=
 
1   s   
c
r
1 g + 
!
r
1   g + k

: (39)
Solving for K
Y
from equation (39) and substituting this into equation (37)
gives the solution for I=Y in terms of r and g: Substituting this solution for
I=Y into the social resource constraint (29), gives the implicit solution for g
in terms of only r :
1   
Y
=
(1   sw)(1   p)
(1 +  se)(1 +  v)

1  

 
Ah   h   r
r   g

(40)
+

(g + k)(1   c)(1   g)
(1   s)r + (1   s    c)(1   g)
 
r + (1   g)
r + (1   g)k

:
Given that  
Y
is exogenous and equal to ; substituting into equation (40)
for r from the Euler equation (36) gives an implicit equation only in g and
allows all other BGP variables to be solved.
For example, the bond interest rate follows from equation (36); the time
allocation among sectors comes from equations (30) and (31); the capital-
output ratio from equation (39), the investment-output ratio from equation
(37), the consumption-output ratio from equation (34); and the rst-order
conditions for the rm give the e¤ective labour to physical capital ratio and
the wage rate. The share of prots in total output is obtained from (15).
Given equations (36) and (40), the dividend and equity values relative to
the capital stock can be solved as well. From equation (12) the balanced-
growth path ratio Ka=Y is
Ka
Y
=
1
g + 
I
Y
=
g + k
g + 
K
Y
; (41)
giving that the steady state dividends to physical capital ratio D=K; from
equations (15), (20), (25), (26) and (41), is
11
DK
= (1   s    )

r
1   g   g

; (42)
where   is
  =
 c(   k)
r
(1 g) + 

(g + )
;
and where it is noted that g is independent of the tax rate on dividends, by
equation (40). From equation (19), the steady state equity value to physical
capital is given by
V
K
=
(1   d)
(1   g)(1  
s    ): (43)
McGrattan and Prescott (2005) derive a similar expression for the value of
the rm; similar to their Propositions 2 and 5, it can be shown that if changes
in the tax on dividends are o¤set by changes in lump-sum transfers, then the
equilibrium path is unchanged.2
3 Social Planner Optimum
The social planner maximizes utility in equation (1), subject to time and
goods constraints in equations (2) and (29), technology in equations (14)
and (3), capital accumulation in equation (13) and the government spending
condition in equation (28). The competitive equilibrium conditions that
replicate the social planner rst-order conditions achieve the second-best
optimum given positive government expenditure; zero taxes and zero gov-
ernment expenditure are the rst-best optimum. The following proposition
2Note that in Turnovsky (1995, chapters 10 and 11), the personal income tax falls
on income from wages, interest income and dividends, while in our paper each of these
income sources has a di¤erent tax rate according to the tax structure of the Baltics; here
interest income from the government bonds is not taxed. This results in the dividend
tax not having a growth e¤ect. And although Turnovsky (1995, ch. 11) also nds that
the personal income tax does not a¤ect the cost of capital when investment is nanced
through retained earnings, the personal income tax still a¤ects the interest rate and hence
the growth rate in Turnovsky and here.
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states one such second-best optimum, which is a special case of Turnovsky
(2000).
Proposition 1 Given  sw =  se =  v =  g =  s =  = 0; equal at rate
taxes on personal and corporate income are second-best optimal.
Proof. The rst order conditions of the social planners problem are similar
to the ones obtained from the consumer and rm problems. But now, instead
of (34) in the representative agent problem, by which Ct
Yt
=
h
(1 sw)(1 p)
(1+se)(1+v)
i
(1 )

lt
ut
,
the social planner consumption ratio is
Ct
Yt
= [1  ] (1  )

lt
ut
: (44)
And in the social planners problem the rst order conditions with respect
to Ct and Kt+1 are
C t l
"(1 )
t = t
and
t = t+1
"
(1  )A

Kt+1
ut+1Ht+1
 1
+ 1  k
#
where t is the Lagrange multiplier of the social resource constraint. This
implies that the Euler equation is
C t l
"(1 )
t = C
 
t+1l
"(1 )
t+1
"
(1  )A

Kt+1
ut+1Ht+1
 1
+ 1  k
#
: (45)
Dening the interest rate rt as
rt  1


Ct 1
Ct
  
lt 1
lt
"(1 )
  1; (46)
which is equal to rt in the competitive equilibrium (equations (5) and (9)),
then equations (45)-(46) imply that
rt + k = (1  )A

Kt
utHt
 1
: (47)
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In the competitive equilibrium problem, the comparable equation is (25), by
which (1   s)   rt
1 g + k

+mt(  k)   c = (1   c)A

Kt
utHt
 1
, where
mt = 
c
P1
j=1
(1 )j 1Qj
i=1(1+
rt+i
1 g )
from equation (23). Comparing equations (34)
and (44), and (25) and (47), it can be seen that one way to implement this
optimum is to set equal tax rates on personal and corporate income, at a level
equal to the share of government expenditure in output:  p =  c = , with all
other tax and subsidy rates set to zero ( sw =  se =  v =  g =  s =  = 0).
The equal at tax rate optimum holds both along the transition path
towards and at the BGP equilibrium. And the balanced tax optimum of
 p =  c =  is found also in Turnovsky (2000), using his equations (19a)
and (19b) under the assumptions that  v = 0 and that government spending
has zero utility or productive e¤ect, as in our economy. More generally,
Turnovsky derives results with positive e¤ects of government spending.3
More generally, as an extension of Turnovsky (2000), the optimum can
be similarly characterized when the social security and VAT tax rates,  sw;
 se and  v; are not restricted to be zero.
Corollary 2 Given  g =  s =  = 0; rather than equal personal and corpo-
rate income tax rates, a balanced tax rate optimum is now an equalization of
the composite labor tax rate, dened as 1   (1 sw)(1 p)
(1+se)(1+v)
; and the corporate
tax rate:
1  (1  
sw)(1   p)
(1 +  se)(1 +  v)
=  c = :
This corollarys more realistic setting implies that with positive social
security and VAT taxes,  sw > 0,  se > 0 and  v > 0, the personal income
tax rate must be less than  to achieve the optimum. The importance of this
is that corporate tax rates would be higher than personal income tax rates
3If government consumption is utility-enhancing as in Turnovsky (2000), then U =P1
t=0 
t (Ctl

t 

t )
1 
1  ; and the condition for the second best optimum in Proposition 1 be-
comes p =  c =  CY with v =  sw =  se = 0. Since, in general, Ct=Yt is not constant
along the transition path, the second best cannot be attained with constant tax rates, but
it can still hold in the steady state. In the rst best the share of government consumption
is then given by  = CY .
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in the optimum, even while the composite labor tax rate and corporate tax
rate remained equal.
In the actual calibration of the model, given in the next section, the
assumptions in the corollary are not too far amiss. For example,  s = 0
is assumed in the corollary while the investment subsidy  s was zero only
in Latvia and Estonia, and was 24% in Lithuania in 2000 (and zero in all
countries in 2007). With  s > 0; an optimum would result if the balance of
tax rates were modied from that given in the corollary to 1  (1 sw)(1 p)
(1+se)(1+v)
=
c s
1 s = : In e¤ect, the corporate tax rate would need to be even higher
than in the corollary.
Or, alternatively, if  = k and  s =  g =  ; instead of instead  g =
 s =  = 0 as in the corollary, then the economic and accounting depreciation
rate would be the same and a positive investment tax would be combined
with a subsidy to capital gains. In this case, the exact same balance of tax
rates results as stated in the corollary.
4 Calibration of the Baseline Model for 2000
4.1 Summary of 2000, 2007 Tax Systems
Information about the tax rates in the year 2000 of the Baltic states is con-
tained in IMF country reports (1998; 1999a; 1999b; 2000a; 2000b; 2001),
while information on the 2007 tax rates can be found on the web-sites of
the Ministries of Finance of all three countries. Table 1 summarizes the tax
rates that are found in law and that are used in the baseline calibration of
the 2000 Baltic tax regimes. Further descriptions of the tax structures of
each of the Baltic countries is found in Appendix A.1. In summary, while
there are di¤erences in tax rates across the Baltics, the similarities in the
major taxes that form most of the government tax revenue show a high de-
gree of "harmonization" in both 2000 and 2007. The tax rate changes from
the baseline of 2000 to the new rates in 2007 are studied in the next section.
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Table 1: Tax Rates in Baltic Countries for Calibration
Tax Rate Values Estonia Latvia Lithuania Estonia Latvia Lithuania
2000 2000 2000 2007 2007 2007
Consumption tax v 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
Personal income tax p 0.26 0.25 0.33 0.22 0.25 0.27
Social security contribution
by workers sw 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.03
by employers se 0.33 0.28 0.30 0.33 0.2409 0.31
Corporate income tax c 0.00 0.25 0.24 0.00 0.15 0.15
Tax on dividends d 0.26 0.00 0.29 0.22 0.00 0.15
Tax on capital gains g 0.26 0.00 0.15 0.22 0.00 0.15
Investment subsidy s 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00
Statutory tax depreciations  0.00 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.20
4.2 Baseline Calibration at Year 2000
Technological parameters are comprised by scale parameters of the human
capital production function Ah, and the market good production function A,
the share of physical capital income in output  and the truedepreciation
rates of physical and human capital k and h: Preferences parameters are
the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion , the leisure weight  and the discount
factor .
Assuming that the economies are in the steady state before the tax rate
changes, three of these parameters are estimated separately for each country
using annual GDP data for 1995-2000:  is set equal to the average share of
government consumption in domestic demand, that is, GDP less net export,
while the parameters  and Ah are chosen to match the average shares of in-
vestment and consumption in domestic demand, respectively, using equations
(35), (37) and (39). These parameter estimates are based on GDP statis-
tics by the expenditure approach at current prices, obtained from the online
databases of national statistical o¢ ces (Statistics Estonia, Central Statistical
Bureau of Latvia, Statistics Lithuania). Note that the resulting value of  is
approximately 0:2; which is also used in Funke and Struliks (2006) study of
Estonian tax change.
Table 2 reports the parameter values and the implied steady state values
for each country. The values of  di¤er substantially due to considerable
di¤erences in the average ratios of investment to domestic demand across the
Baltic states. The lowest ratio is 20% for Latvia, while the highest is 26:9%
for Estonia. And, consequently, Latvia has the highest and Estonia the lowest
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C=Y ratio since the shares of government consumption are approximately the
same. This, in turn, results in the highest steady state K=H and K=Y ratios
for Estonia and the lowest ratios for Latvia. In the case of Estonia, the stead
state value of the rm is equal to the capital stock according to (43) since
 d =  g and  s =   = 0.4 While for Lithuania the market value of a unit
of the rms capital V=K is the lowest. No data appear to be available on
the capital to output ratio K=Y and the value of equity to output ratio V=Y
for the Baltic countries; but for comparison to Table 2 note that McGrattan
and Prescott (2005, Tables 4 and 5) report that the (sum of tangible and
intangible) capital to output ratio was 1:68 for the U.S. and was 1:96 for U.K.
during 1990-2001, while the value of equity to output ratio, respectively, was
1:576 and 1:845 during 1998-2001. The allocation of time is similar across the
countries, with the share of time devoted to both goods and human capital
production being the highest in Estonia and the lowest in Lithuania.
The rest of the parameters are set equal across the three Baltic states.
The coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is set at  = 1:5; the discount factor is
 = 0:99; and the utility weight for leisure weight  is selected to ensure that
approximately 21% of time is spent on work (1840 annual hours of work).
The long run growth rate is common for all three countries and is set at 2%.
Finally, the scale parameter A a¤ects the ratio of physical to human capital
in the economy and this is normalized to A = 1. We assume that physical
capital becomes obsolete at a faster rate than human capital, setting k = 0:1
and h = 0:01 in all three countries, similar to Jones, Manuelli and Siu
(2005) who discuss the di¤erent estimates of h at length. The steady state
interest rate in each country is set equal to the world interest rate of 4:1%
used in McGrattan and Prescott (2000, Tables 4 and 5) that approximately
corresponds to the risk-free rate on 30-year ination-protected US Treasury
bonds in the 1st quarter of 2000. Given that r = 4:1% and g = 2%, plus
choosing leisure near to 50% and labour time near to 20% gives values for
Ah and h from equations (30) and (31).
4By substituting (26) and (25) into (24), one can verify that under Estonian tax system,
Vt = Kt also holds outside the steady state.
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Table 2: Baseline Calibration: 2000
Latvia
    A Ah k h 
1.5 1.35 0.990 0.242 1 0.100 0.1 0.01 0.205
g r l u z K=H C=Y K=Y V=Y
0.020 0.041 0.491 0.209 0.299 0.411 0.595 1.667 1.397
Estonia
    A Ah k h 
1.5 1.35 0.990 0.348 1 0.100 0.1 0.01 0.203
g r l u z K=H C=Y K=Y V=Y
0.020 0.041 0.489 0.211 0.301 0.726 0.528 2.241 2.241
Lithuania
    A Ah k h 
1.5 1.35 0.990 0.259 1 0.103 0.1 0.01 0.205
g r l u z K=H C=Y K=Y V=Y
0.020 0.041 0.504 0.204 0.292 0.435 0.585 1.750 1.111
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Tables 3-5 show one table for each Baltic country in which modied results
are obtained by varying one parameter at a time with all other parameters
staying at the benchmark values. It results that for all three countries, when
a parameter is changed, the a¤ected variables move in the same direction.
The largest variations in the growth rate g come from changes in utility para-
meters and parameters a¤ecting human capital accumulation. The discount
factor and elasticity of relative risk aversion a¤ect g through (36) while 
a¤ects g through the leisure time and equation (31). The parameters of hu-
man capital accumulation a¤ect growth rate through equations (30) and (31).
The growth rate is stable to changes in the share of physical capital  and
the depreciation rate of physical capital k. So is time allocated to di¤erent
activities. Changes in the utility parameters that lead to higher growth also
lead to a larger share of time devoted to human capital accumulation z. It
is accompanied with a bigger variation in time devoted to leisure than to
market activity. An increase in government consumption raises the growth
rate but decreases one-for-one the consumption to output ratio C=Y . The
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C=Y ratio also falls with the increase in the share of capital income in out-
put  but otherwise this ratio is relatively insensitive to parameter changes.
The changes in value of equities to output ratio V=Y are positively correlated
with the changes in the capital to output ratio K=Y , and the biggest changes
in both ratios come from varying parameters of the market good production
technology  and k and the scale parameter of the human capital production
function Ah.
Table 3: Alternative Parameter Values and the Latvian Calibration
g r l u z K=H C=Y K=Y V=Y
 = 1:20 0.032 0.050 0.405 0.174 0.421 0.314 0.589 1.561 1.320
 = 1:80 0.014 0.037 0.531 0.225 0.244 0.460 0.598 1.719 1.434
 = 1:00 0.025 0.049 0.413 0.237 0.350 0.429 0.598 1.571 1.324
 = 1:70 0.016 0.035 0.553 0.188 0.259 0.394 0.592 1.750 1.460
 = 0:985 0.014 0.037 0.534 0.226 0.240 0.464 0.598 1.723 1.437
 = 0:995 0.027 0.046 0.442 0.189 0.369 0.354 0.591 1.605 1.352
 = 0:20 0.020 0.041 0.492 0.209 0.299 0.312 0.630 1.377 1.154
 = 0:30 0.020 0.041 0.490 0.210 0.300 0.590 0.547 2.062 1.728
Ah = 0:07 0.009 0.025 0.506 0.219 0.275 0.514 0.587 1.908 1.579
Ah = 0:13 0.030 0.057 0.485 0.204 0.311 0.343 0.602 1.482 1.256
k = 0:07 0.020 0.041 0.496 0.208 0.296 0.563 0.604 2.126 1.746
k = 0:13 0.020 0.041 0.489 0.210 0.301 0.319 0.589 1.372 1.172
h = 0:00 0.024 0.046 0.537 0.228 0.235 0.424 0.597 1.600 1.346
h = 0:02 0.016 0.036 0.446 0.191 0.364 0.396 0.592 1.740 1.452
 = 0:15 0.018 0.039 0.515 0.201 0.284 0.405 0.649 1.698 1.420
 = 0:25 0.021 0.043 0.471 0.217 0.313 0.416 0.551 1.640 1.377
Table 4: Alternative Parameter Values and the Estonian Calibration
g r l u z K=H C=Y K=Y V=Y
 = 1:20 0.032 0.050 0.402 0.175 0.423 0.541 0.522 2.084 2.084
 = 1:80 0.015 0.037 0.528 0.226 0.246 0.823 0.531 2.320 2.320
 = 1:00 0.025 0.049 0.412 0.237 0.351 0.741 0.534 2.102 2.102
 = 1:70 0.016 0.035 0.549 0.190 0.262 0.711 0.523 2.364 2.364
 = 0:985 0.014 0.037 0.531 0.227 0.242 0.831 0.532 2.326 2.326
 = 0:995 0.027 0.046 0.439 0.190 0.371 0.616 0.524 2.148 2.148
 = 0:30 0.020 0.041 0.488 0.211 0.301 0.539 0.565 1.928 1.928
 = 0:40 0.020 0.041 0.490 0.210 0.300 1.017 0.488 2.575 2.575
Ah = 0:07 0.010 0.025 0.499 0.222 0.280 0.961 0.512 2.601 2.601
Ah = 0:13 0.030 0.057 0.485 0.204 0.311 0.578 0.540 1.969 1.969
k = 0:07 0.019 0.040 0.498 0.207 0.295 1.009 0.546 2.804 2.804
k = 0:13 0.020 0.042 0.482 0.213 0.305 0.556 0.516 1.870 1.870
h = 0:00 0.023 0.046 0.536 0.229 0.235 0.737 0.532 2.142 2.142
h = 0:02 0.017 0.036 0.442 0.192 0.366 0.713 0.523 2.349 2.349
 = 0:15 0.018 0.039 0.514 0.202 0.285 0.720 0.579 2.290 2.290
 = 0:25 0.022 0.043 0.465 0.219 0.317 0.731 0.483 2.195 2.195
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Table 5: Alternative Parameter Values and the Lithuanian Calibration
g r l u z K=H C=Y K=Y V=Y
 = 1:20 0.032 0.050 0.417 0.171 0.413 0.331 0.579 1.634 1.037
 = 1:80 0.014 0.037 0.543 0.219 0.238 0.487 0.588 1.808 1.148
 = 1:00 0.025 0.049 0.426 0.231 0.343 0.453 0.589 1.645 1.044
 = 1:70 0.016 0.035 0.565 0.183 0.252 0.418 0.582 1.842 1.169
 = 0:985 0.014 0.037 0.546 0.220 0.234 0.492 0.588 1.813 1.151
 = 0:995 0.027 0.046 0.454 0.185 0.361 0.374 0.581 1.682 1.068
 = 0:20 0.020 0.041 0.504 0.204 0.292 0.297 0.633 1.350 0.857
 = 0:30 0.020 0.041 0.503 0.204 0.292 0.559 0.552 2.023 1.284
Ah = 0:07 0.009 0.024 0.519 0.214 0.266 0.558 0.575 2.030 1.288
Ah = 0:13 0.029 0.055 0.498 0.200 0.302 0.368 0.592 1.572 0.998
k = 0:07 0.020 0.040 0.509 0.202 0.288 0.589 0.597 2.207 1.401
k = 0:13 0.020 0.041 0.500 0.206 0.294 0.340 0.577 1.452 0.922
h = 0:00 0.023 0.046 0.550 0.222 0.228 0.447 0.588 1.680 1.067
h = 0:02 0.017 0.036 0.458 0.187 0.356 0.421 0.582 1.826 1.159
 = 0:15 0.018 0.039 0.528 0.196 0.276 0.429 0.639 1.785 1.133
 = 0:25 0.021 0.043 0.483 0.212 0.306 0.440 0.541 1.720 1.092
5 Tax Reform E¤ects from 2000-2007
After setting out the compensating utility measure, Section 5.1 establishes
the maximum possible gains from tax reforms, starting with the 2000 baseline
system and moving to the (second-best) optimum of at rate taxes as in
Proposition 1. Section 5.2 presents the actual growth rate and utility changes
of the 2000 to 2007 reforms. And Section 5.3 shows the contribution of each
type of tax to growth and welfare under the assumption that the same tax
revenue is raised as in 2007, when only the one tax is changed; this provides
a comparison of the di¤erent taxes in the sense of which are best ones to
use to raise revenue. Note that all comparisons of actual and experimental
reforms are conducted using the long run steady state and always include the
transition dynamics; in other words, we calculate the welfare gains accruing
from the date of reform to innity.
With tax reform, the initial post-reform state of the economy is not at
its steady state equilibrium. Therefore, to calculate welfare gains from a tax
reform, the transition dynamics to the new steady state must be taken into
account. For that, we rst solve for the policy functions relating di¤erent
economic variables to the state variables, as described in Appendix A.2.
The compensating consumption measure is constructed by following Lu-
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cas (1990) and dening the indirect utility function W (; ) as
W (; ) =
1X
t=0
t
((1 + )Ctl

t)
1 
1   :
This is the utility the consumer obtains under the tax system
 =
 
 c;  p;  sw;  se;  v;  d;  g;  s; 

when in addition there is a consumption
supplement of Ct at each date t. When the tax system changes from a
set of initial rates, say  old; to a new set of rates, say new; the percent of
consumption goods that compensate utility for the new tax system new is
equal to the  that equates utility in the new regime to the utility of the old
regime (when  = 0), as given by the following standard equation:
W (;  old) =W (0; new) : (48)
Assuming the economy is in the steady state under the old tax system, then
Ct = C0 (1 + g)
t while lt is constant and W (;  old) is equal to
W (;  old) =
((1 + )C0l
)1 
1  
1
1  (1 + g)1  ;
where C0, l and g are steady state values corresponding to the baseline cal-
ibration. Here human capital is normalized at date t = 0 to H0 = 1. The
representation of W (0; new) is more complex in that it includes consump-
tion and leisure both along transition path and in the new steady state; this
is computed numerically.
5.1 Maximum Possible Gain From Tax Reform
In this economy, the gain from moving to the second-best optimum of equal
at rate taxes on personal and corporate income provides an upper bound
to the potential welfare gains from tax reform. The implementation of the
second-best optimum assumes that the Baltic economies start in steady state
in 2000, and move to the new second-best optimum. Table 6 reports values of
variables in the steady state of the second best optimum; Table 7 summarizes
the total welfare gains including transition dynamics and the impact on the
government budget as a result of going to the second best optimum. The
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total utility gains, in consumption terms, for Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania,
respectively, are  = 13:75%,  = 11:18% and  = 16:27%. The steady state
growth rate increases by almost one percentage point in all three economies.
Table 7 also shows the impact of the tax changes on revenues, where
notationally, PV R is the present value of government revenues, PV T the
present value of government transfers and PV Y the present value of output.
The table indicates that a result of such a at rate policy is that the present
discounted value of all future tax revenue falls; for example, in the case
of Latvia the decline is from 5.791 to 2.395. However the model does allow
implementation of the second best outcome with the same revenue as in 2000
by using in addition the VAT tax, if there are no restrictions on the signs of
tax rates. With  sw =  se = 0; equations (34) and (44) imply that a necessary
condition for optimality is
1   p
1 +  v
= 1   . Given that this condition holds
and using equation (33), the sum of consumption and personal income tax
revenues is
 vCt + 
pwtutHt =
 v(1   p)wtltHt
(1 +  v)
+  pwtutHt
=

 v (1  )

lt

  ut

+ ut

wtHt
In case of Latvia, when moving from the tax system of 2000 to this second
best tax regime, all along the transition path the term [(lt=)  ut] is positive.
This means that government revenue is maximized if  v is set as high as
possible, and employment is subsidized,  p < 0. The government can raise
PV R = 5:791 as in the Latvian 2000 tax system, although not realistically,
with  c = 0:205,  v = 8:1453,  p =  6:2705 and the rest of taxes set equal
to zero.
5.2 Actual Utility Gain from Tax Reform
Table 8 summarizes the results of the marginal growth rate increases changes
and the more signicant consumption-equivalent utility gains for the actual
2000 to 2007 tax changes in each of the Baltic countries, including transition
dynamics. The utility gains are around 2%; with  = 1:54%, 2:29%, and
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Table 6: The Second Best Outcome
Latvia
g r l u z K=H C=Y K=Y V=Y
0.0285 0.054 0.362 0.255 0.384 0.342 0.634 1.251 1.251
Estonia
g r l u z K=H C=Y K=Y V=Y
0.0277 0.053 0.370 0.252 0.378 0.629 0.565 1.816 1.816
Lithuania
g r l u z K=H C=Y K=Y V=Y
0.0295 0.056 0.362 0.254 0.384 0.371 0.623 1.326 1.326
Table 7: Second Best Optimal Changes in Utility, Growth and Revenue
Second Best Optimum
Latvia Estonia Lithuania
% 13.747 11.182 16.270
g 0.0085 0.0077 0.0095
PV R 2000 5.791 6.686 6.088
new 2.395 3.090 2.401
PV R -3.397 -3.596 -3.687
 2000 0.205 0.203 0.205
new 0.205 0.203 0.205
PV T=PV Y 2000 0.269 0.213 0.289
new 0 0 0
PV R=PV Y 2000 0.474 0.416 0.494
new 0.205 0.203 0.205
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2:64% for Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. Estonia and Lithuania each reduced
the personal income tax rate while Latvia did not, which may explain the
bigger gains in these two countries. And Lithuania, with the highest gain,
in addition reduced the corporate tax rate, while Estonia did not. Reform
benets of each tax is explored next in Section 5.3.
Note that the importance of including the transition dynamics is that
without including them the ranking of the gains from reform changes some-
what, although the magnitude of the gains only changes by about 10%. If
the e¤ect of the transition dynamics is not included, the utility gain ^ is
from going straight to the 2007 steady state, from the 2000 steady state; the
results in this case would be that ^ = 1:693 for Latvia, 2:619% for Estonia
and 2:366% for Lithuania. Estonia now would end up with the biggest gain.
This change in rankings occurs because the transition dynamics cause Latvia
and Estonia to have a lower gain, and Lithuania to have a bigger gain. As
Appendix A.3 further details, the transition dynamics for Lithuania are dif-
ferent because the capital stock in the 2007 steady state after the tax reform
is lower than in the 2000 steady state, while for Latvia and Estonia the post-
reform capital stock is higher. And in short, increasing the capital stock
requires lower consumption on the transition, while decreasing the capital
stock leads to higher consumption on the transition.
Table 8: Actual Reform Changes in Utility, Growth and Revenue
2000-2007 Actual Tax Changes
Latvia Estonia Lithuania
% 1.536 2.286 2.635
g 0.0006 0.0011 0.0008
PV R 2000 5.791 6.686 6.088
2007 5.551 6.232 5.782
PV R -0.240 -0.454 -0.306
 2000 0.205 0.203 0.205
2007 0.205 0.203 0.205
PV T=PV Y 2000 0.269 0.213 0.289
2007 0.250 0.188 0.267
PV R=PV Y 2000 0.474 0.416 0.494
2007 0.455 0.391 0.472
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In terms of tax revenue, and assuming here that the government share
of output remains at ; Table 8 also shows that the PV R and the ratios
of PV T=PV Y and PV R=PV Y of each country dropped modestly after the
reform. Other equilibrium values for each of the countries are given in Table
9, which compare to the baseline in Table 2.
Table 9: 2007 Baltic Tax System
Latvia
g r l u z K=H C=Y K=Y V=Y
0.021 0.042 0.482 0.213 0.305 0.421 0.593 1.679 1.516
Estonia
g r l u z K=H C=Y K=Y V=Y
0.021 0.043 0.472 0.216 0.311 0.751 0.524 2.252 2.252
Lithuania
g r l u z K=H C=Y K=Y V=Y
0.021 0.042 0.492 0.208 0.300 0.418 0.593 1.674 1.583
5.3 Experimental Tax Reform
There are better ways in which tax rates could have been changed compared
to the actual tax reforms, while keeping discounted tax revenues constant at
the same lower level as was found post-reform (with PV R at 5.551, 6.232,
and 5.782 for Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania). A simple way to show this
is to consider decreasing just one tax so as to generate the entire revenue
decrease of 2007, starting from the 2000 baseline, and to compare this result
across all of the taxes, and for each country. Table 10 gives the new compen-
sated utility gains from such experiments, with transition dynamics always
included. Since some initial tax rates are zero or close to zero, almost half
of the new rates end up being negative, which is not realistic. But still this
experiment shows the welfare ranking of each tax, and it can be seen that the
ranking is the same for all three economies. The highest gain is from lower-
ing the personal income tax or social security contributions, followed by the
VAT; the corporate income tax generates the lowest welfare gain (except for
the 0 e¤ect of the non-distortionary dividend tax). This is consistent with
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Lithuania and Estonia having higher gains from the 2000-2007 changes than
did Latvia, in that Latvia did not decrease the personal income tax while
the other two nations did.5
Table 10: Revenue Equivalent Changes of Each Tax
Latvia Estonia Lithuania
Tax Rate g % Tax Rate g % Tax Rate g %
p 0.2157 0.0208 2.0777 0.2065 0.0212 2.8098 0.2891 0.0211 2.9844
sw 0.0484 0.0208 2.0777 -0.0723 0.0212 2.8098 -0.0505 0.0211 2.9844
se 0.2241 0.0208 2.0777 0.2404 0.0212 2.8098 0.2252 0.0211 2.9844
v 0.1482 0.0205 1.2883 0.1290 0.0208 1.8218 0.1394 0.0206 1.7954
c -0.1238 0.0202 0.2309 -0.0763 0.0207 0.4913 0.1711 0.0206 0.5972
d -0.6701 0.0200 0 -0.3324 0.0200 0 -0.5928 0.0200 0
g -0.6496 0.0209 0.4580 -0.0007 0.0210 0.5558 -0.2671 0.0208 0.7153
s 0.0603 0.0205 0.3800 0.0774 0.0208 0.5143 0.3074 0.0206 0.6256
Table 11 shows that using higher but equal at tax rates on personal
and corporate income, with all other taxes set to zero as in the optimum
of Proposition 1 and with the same revenue as is found for 2007, also leads
to bigger welfare gains than the actual reforms for all countries. The gains
are 2:214; 2:556 and 3:032 for Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, as compared
to 1:536, 2:286 and 2:635 in Table 8 for the three countries under the actual
reforms, for a simple average of 24% higher gains in the Baltics.
And the at tax gains are bigger than the gains seen in all of the previous
experiments in Table 10 for Latvia and Lithuania. For Estonia, the rst three
tax reductions in the personal and social security taxes yield a gain of 2:81%
in Table 10 which is better than the 2:56% gain from the at tax policy in
Table 11. In sum, the experiments show that equal at rate taxes are very
attractive, but also that just balancing out the system better in terms of
reducing the composite labor tax can be the best reform.
5We do not report revenue equivalent changes in the depreciation rate . First, in the
case of Estonia, variations in the depreciation rate do not a¤ect tax revenues because  c =
0. Second, in the case of Latvia a value of  cannot be found that generates PV R = 5:551
without leading to an explosive path of kat . For Lithuania,  = 0:6203% when  = 0:0190,
assuming ka = 0:2372 which is described at the end of Appendix A.3.
26
Table 11: Revenue Equivalent Tax Changes with Flat Tax
 c =  p
Latvia Estonia Lithuania
 c =  p 0.447 0.394 0.456
% 2.214 2.556 3.032
g 0.0012 0.0017 0.0016
PV R 2000 5.791 6.686 6.088
new 5.551 6.232 5.782
PV R -0.240 -0.454 -0.306
 2000 0.205 0.203 0.205
new 0.205 0.203 0.205
PV T=PV Y 2000 0.269 0.213 0.289
new 0.242 0.191 0.251
PV R=PV Y 2000 0.474 0.416 0.494
new 0.447 0.394 0.456
6 Open Economy Case
The results of the tax reform analysis also hold in the open economy case,
which is the case assumed in Funke and Strulik (2006). Now allowing the
Baltics to borrow capital on the international market, then Bt in consumers
budget constraint is dened as net foreign assets, rather than government
bonds. Eliminating Bt from the government budget constraint, it is assumed
that the government runs a balanced budget every period. Consumer and
rm problems are the same as in the case of a closed economy model, and
consequently the same rst order conditions together with the budget con-
straints still describe the equilibrium solution. However, in addition it is
assumed that the world interest rate is constant and equal to r = 0:041 as
in the baseline calibration. These assumptions imply zero net trade before
the tax reform, and it is assumed that initially the consumer has zero foreign
assets, so that B0 = 0.
Table 12 states the new steady state values corresponding to the 2007
tax rates; the table also reports net exports Xt=Yt and net foreign assets
Bt=Yt normalized by output. Given a constant interest rate, the growth rate
and time allocation are independent of tax rates according to (30)-(31). In
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the steady state, all three countries run a trade decit of 2-3% of output.
The welfare gain from the tax changes for Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania,
respectively are  =  0:054%,  =  0:095% and  = 0:391%, which are
lower compared to the closed economy model (Table 8), but of the same
ranking. And only Lithuania experiences a gain from the 2000-2007 tax
reform while Latvia and Estonia experience losses.
Transitional dynamics for the open economy model are similar and given
in Figures (6)-(8) of Appendix A.3. Note that these gures indicate that div-
idends are negative in period 0, which can be viewed as unrealistic. However,
avoiding this result by allowing for new equity issue gives the same solution
for the rm problem given that  d =  g; which is true in all but one case of
2000 and 2007 tax law for the Baltic countries (Table 1).To see this, consider
that the rm nances its investment through retained earnings and distrib-
utes the rest in dividends. Since the period 0 investment demand exceeds the
retained earnings supply of capital, the resulting dividends are negative. Ex-
tending the economy to allow the rm to issue new equity, negative dividends
can be avoided. In this case, equation (16) becomes
(1   c)t +  sIt +  cKat + qt+1(Et+1   Et) = Dt + It:
Combining it with the arbitrage condition (11), leads to the equation of
motion for the value of the rm
Vt+1 = Vt
 
1 +
rt +
 
 d    g rEt
1   g
!
  [(1   c)t  (1   s)It+  cKat ]: (49)
The maximization of rms value implies the minimization of the cost of
capital 1 +
rt+(d g)rEt
1 g with a consequent dividend payout rate r
E
t = Dt=Vt.
With the same tax rate for dividends and capital gains, the dividend payout
rate rEt does not matter, in that equations (21) and (49), and the equilibria,
are the same.
Table 13 reports the necessary changes in tax rates and resulting welfare
gains that correspond to the same experiments as in Table 10. The welfare
ranking of taxes is the same as in the closed economy model; the magnitudes
of the utility gains are smaller, and are negative for the corporate income
tax.
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Table 12: Open Economy Steady State Values for Tax System in 2007
Latvia
g r l u z K=H C=Y K=Y V=Y X=Y B=Y
0.020 0.041 0.491 0.209 0.299 0.419 0.614 1.691 1.526 -0.022 1.029
Estonia
g r l u z K=H C=Y K=Y V=Y X=Y B=Y
0.020 0.041 0.489 0.211 0.301 0.747 0.557 2.282 2.282 -0.034 1.597
Lithuania
g r l u z K=H C=Y K=Y V=Y X=Y B=Y
0.020 0.041 0.504 0.204 0.292 0.416 0.620 1.692 1.599 -0.028 1.323
Table 13: Open Economy Revenue Equivalent Tax Changes
Latvia Estonia Lithuania
Tax Rate % Tax Rate % Tax Rate %
 p 0.2183 0.094 0.2137 0.121 0.2789 0.182
 sw 0.0516 0.094 -0.0625 0.121 -0.0655 0.182
 se 0.2282 0.094 0.2518 0.121 0.2079 0.182
 v 0.1521 0.056 0.1382 0.074 0.1323 0.106
 c -0.1954 -0.443 -0.1255 -1.899 0.0944 -2.446
 d -0.5419 0 -0.1842 0 -0.6585 0
 s 0.0958 -1.625 0.1287 -2.371 0.3731 -2.809
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7 Discussion
The tax reform results are limited to the set of assumed taxes. For example,
Stokey and Rebelo (1995) allow human capital production to be taxed, which
allows for a higher impact of tax rates on growth. And extending the Section
2 model to allow for both equity and debt nance allows for the dividend tax
to be distortionary as in Kim (1998), where labor taxes also directly e¤ect
the real interest rate. But also important, in nding the e¤ect of reforms, is
what is the initial set of tax rates.
For example, in contrast to Section 5s results, Devereux and Love (1994)
nd that the consumption tax dominates the personal income tax, which in
turn dominates the corporate income tax, with this ranking holding for both
growth rates and utility. Yet what emerges is that not that the models are
inherently at odds. Rather such a di¤erence can occur because of di¤erent
initial distributions of the tax rates. In support of how the ranking of reforms
depends on the initial tax system, Table 14 replicates the Devereux and Love
(1994) ranking under one set of initial tax rates but replicates the ranking of
Sections 5 and 6 under a di¤erent initial set of tax rates.
Using a hypothetical initial set of tax rates (rather than the baseline
calibration), Table 14 sets the government consumption of taxes to zero,
so that  = 0, and all tax revenues raised are returned lump sum to the
consumer. While in the baseline calibration  is calibrated according to
the data, here it is chosen to be  = 0 , which would be the value that was
optimally chosen if this were endogenous since it is assumed that government
expenditure has no benets. First, initial taxes are also all set to zero, in
the rst experiment, so that with  = 0 the economy is at its (rst-best)
optimum; second, initial taxes on personal income and consumption goods
are set at 0:25; so that in this case the economy is not at its optimum, with
components of the composite labor tax being over-taxed.
The rest of parameters are set as in baseline calibration for Latvia. The
left-hand side of Table 14 shows the growth and utility changes from start-
ing from 0 initial tax rates and then raising a set amount of tax revenue
(PV T = 0:25) from just a single tax increase, for each of four di¤erent taxes.
This shows that raising the revenue using the VAT is best, followed closely
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by raising the personal income tax rate, while raising the revenue with the
corporate tax leads to a much bigger loss of utility; this is the same rank-
ing as in Devereux and Love (1994). But now consider the right-hand side
columns of the Table 14. With the initial tax rates for both personal income
and the VAT now assumed to be equal to 25%, instead of 0, and all other tax
rates equal zero, the initial tax revenue is PV T = 4:79: The same experiment
is run of increasing tax revenue by the same amount of PV T = 0:25; from
PV T = 4:79 to PV T = 5:04; with just one tax. With composite labor taxes
over-taxed through already high taxes on personal income and consumption,
this results in a re-ordering of the utility ranking to that of Sections 5 and 6:
raising the additional revenue through the corporate tax rate is now much
better for utility than raising the revenue with the personal income tax, while
the VAT is marginally worse than the corporate income tax.
Table 14: Raising Revenue from Di¤erent Intial Tax Distributions
Tax Revenue: 0  ! 0:25 Tax Revenue: 4:79  ! 5:04
Tax Rate g % Tax Rate g %
Initial New Initial New
 p 0 0.0271 0.0280 -0.0338 0.25 0.2755 0.0193 -1.7305
 v 0 0.0258 0.0281 -0.0289 0.25 0.2748 0.0196 -0.9746
 c 0 0.0856 0.0281 -0.1676 0 0.0742 0.0196 -0.9737
 d 0 0.5124 0.0285 0 0 0.5618 0.0199 0
8 Conclusions
The model includes an explicit corporate sector within a Lucas (1988) human
capital economy, with transition dynamics as in Lucas (1990), and with a
second-best optimum of at taxes on corporate and labor income resulting
when government spending is constrained to be a fraction of output. Moving
to the at tax optimum from the 2000 tax rate law, welfare improvements
were 11 to 16% of consumption. The utility gain from the actual tax reforms
from 2000 to 2007, within the closed economy, was 1.5 to 2.6% with Lithuania
having the highest gain. The same ranking of gains from actual law changes
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was also found under open economy assumptions, although only Lithuania
showed a positive gain.
Experiments kept the same revenue loss as was found in the actual 2000-
2007 reforms, while lowering only one tax rate to yield that revenue loss.
This showed that the personal income tax and the social security tax de-
crease always gave the biggest utility gain, under both closed and open econ-
omy assumptions. Another experiment within the closed economy, of again
achieving the same revenue as in 2007 law, showed that establishing equal
at tax rate on personal and corporate income with zero tax rates on all
other taxes, gave larger utility gains for all three countries than did the ac-
tual 2000-2007 reforms. And this equal at tax policy gave larger utility
gains than using any single tax decrease for both Latvia and Lithuania, and
gains for Estonia that were almost as high as those achieved by decreasing
only the personal income tax rate.
Given the initial set of tax rates in the Baltics and the assumption that
government spending is a constant fraction of output, altogether the results
suggest that an imbalance of taxes that fall on labor relative to taxes that fall
on capital causes welfare to be lower than it needs to be. The social security
taxes would di¤er in e¤ect from the personal income tax if benets of pension
were modeled, which would be a useful albeit di¢ cult extension. Similarly
the general public benets of government expenditure are not modelled here
although for example public capital is an important source of infrastructure
and growth in many economies. For example, if such expenditures a¤ect the
return on physical capital di¤erently from the return on human capital, then
these expenditures would be expected to a¤ect how the balance of the tax
system, between labor and capital taxes, determines welfare.
Technically, the paper uses Judds (1992) non-linear simulation method
to simulate dynamics. Its simpler human capital investment function from
Lucas (1988) allows for more tractable analytic results as compared to Dev-
ereux and Love (1994). And the paper contains more tax experiments than
is typical in order to bring out the sensitivity of the results.6
Inclusion of the ination tax would further increase the labor type taxes
since the ination tax is similar in e¤ect to a labor tax when modeled with
6We are indebted to a referees helpful summary here.
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a goods-leisure margin. Thus with a positive ination rate, the results for
the Baltics would be predicted to show that the capital taxes should be
even more relied upon than is found in the paper. Similarly, modelling the
evasion of taxes would go in the direction of making balanced labor and
capital taxes desirable although this depends upon how evasion is modeled.
Evasion often acts as an arbitraging device whereby the higher taxed income
is made articially into the lower taxed type of income. In countries with
relatively low corporate tax rates, the personal income can be turned into
corporate income by having employees of companies made into consultants
that operate their own business, even though they continue to do the same
job in all but name.
These extensions would appear to strengthen the intuition that large im-
balances between the e¤ective, or "composite", capital and labor tax rates
may not create the best tax system. This leaves the analysis with government
expenditure as a constant fraction of output as one answer for why adoption
of zero capital tax rates, as in the Ramsey solution with exogenous govern-
ment spending, may not be widespread in practice. And it demonstrates
that the Baltic countries, and other similarly congured countries, might be
better o¤ with more balanced e¤ective labor versus capital tax rates.
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A Appendix.
A.1 Statutory Tax Rate Structure Description
The major taxes included in the model are value added tax, and personal
and corporate income direct taxes. Capital gains and dividend taxes are part
of the income tax law as statutory rates. In the growth literature that deals
with the e¤ect of distortionary taxation on growth, the calibrated tax rates
typically are not those specied by tax laws, but rather they are estimated.
For example, Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) calculates the e¤ective tax
rate as the ratio of tax revenues of the consolidated government to the tax
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base as calculated from national accounts; this is a type of average tax rate
that the representative agent faces. The use of statutory taxes here is justied
by fact that the tax rates in the Baltic countries are at rate taxes that do
not depend on the income level or the status of the enterprise. In addition,
the tax bases of all taxes were widened over time so as to eliminate most of
the exemptions. Deductions that allow for a decrease in taxable income are
mainly of a lump-sum nature.
The Baltic countries have opted for a reduction in the income taxes and,
especially, in corporate income taxes. The corporate income tax fell to 15%
both in Latvia and Lithuania, while in Estonia tax rates on all sources of
income was lowered to 22%. Additionally, tax on dividends was reduced to
15% and personal income tax to 27% in Lithuania. Other changes include the
elimination of the investment subsidy in Lithuania with taxable income now
being decreased by the value of the capital depreciation, with depreciation
rates varying from 5% to 33%. In the calibration of the model the deprecia-
tion rate is set at 20%. Social security contributions paid by the employee is
3% and by the employer 27%, additionally the employer pays 3% for health
insurance and 1% for accidents; it is similar in Latvia.
In Latvia, in the case of personal income tax, taxable income is decreased
by a nontaxable minimum, by deductions for each dependent person and by
expenditures for health care and education up to a certain amount. These
deductions do not a¤ect the marginal tax rates that matter for optimality
conditions. Their only consequence is to decrease the total tax revenues
raised by the government. Use of an average tax rate on the basis of total
taxes may therefore be misleading in terms of the e¤ect on the economic
margins and on growth. The marginal tax rates appear to be more closely
modeled in the Baltic countries by the statutory rates.
In all Baltic states the base rate for the VAT is 18%. Although excise tax
can be thought of as part of consumption tax, the rate of consumption tax in
the model is set equal to the VAT rate. We justify not accounting for excise
taxes by arguing that often there are other reasons to levy an excise tax, for
example because goods subject to excise taxes exert externalities that are not
captured by the model. And because educational services are excluded from
the VAT, this provides additional justication for treating human capital
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production as a non-market good.
Although the personal income tax is applied to di¤erent sources of income,
here this refers only to the wage income source. As was mentioned previously
this income is decreased by di¤erent lump-sum deductions when calculating
taxable income. Taxation of capital gains and dividends is determined by
either the law on personal income or the law on corporate income. Usually,
in order to avoid double taxation, income that is already taxed as corporate
income is not taxed again as personal income. Therefore all personal income
that is derived from the ownership of enterprises through capital gains or
dividends is not taxed in Latvia.
From January 1, 2000, Estonia introduced a tax law that abolishes taxa-
tion of prots but introduces taxes on distributed prots at the rate of 26/74.
Thus as long as prots are retained by the company they are not subject to
taxes. Enterprises pay on the behalf of owners taxes on dividends equal to
26/74 of the amount of paid dividends. This is the same as if the individual
pays tax of 26% on dividends received. In order to simplify notation the
model species that the tax on dividends is paid by the shareholder.
In Lithuania the tax rate on enterprise income applied to legal persons
was also decreased from January 1, 2000, to 24%, the rate applied previously
to partnerships. Thus, starting 2000, all enterprises were subject to the
same tax rate. Lithuanian law on corporate income allows deductions from
taxable income of either retained earnings or the amount of investment in
long term assets; these cases coincide in the model. This implies setting the
investment subsidy at a 24% rate. Such tax treatment of corporate prots
is very close to the Estonian case because under the present specication of
model non-distributed prots are equal to investment. In terms of the model,
the Estonian treatment of non-distributed prots as tax exempt is the same
as the Lithuanian treatment of investment as tax exempt.
Lithuanian law taxes capital gains only if they are not reinvested back
into securities; the rate of taxation for such gains is 15%. However, in the
model it is assumed that equities are neither sold nor bought, making for
zero capital gains. On other hand, the model species that taxes are paid
whenever the price of an equity increases so that the tax on capital gains
occurs implicitly, on the accrued but yet unrealized capital gains; and taxes
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are reimbursed when the price of an equity decreases, again on an accrued
basis. So to the extent that capital gains are reinvested in Lithuania and
untaxed, the model overstates the e¤ect of the tax.
Another way to promote investment is through a faster depreciation of
capital since taxable income is also decreased by the amount of depreciation.
Latvia especially uses depreciation as a tool for promoting investment by
allowing a decrease in taxable income by double the depreciated amount of
capital stock. In terms of this model it means that if statutory depreciation
rate is ; then in the model we must use the rate 2. Since o¢ cial depreciation
rate varies across di¤erent forms of equipment  from 10% on buildings to
35% on high-tech  a middle rate is chosen of 20% or, allowing for double
depreciation, 40%.
A.2 Policy Functions
With a tax reform, the initial post-reform state of the economy is not at its
steady state equilibrium. To calculate welfare gains from a tax reform, the
transition dynamics to the new steady state must be taken into account. In
particular, given the paths of consumption and leisure after a tax reform,
utility changes from the reform can be calculated. For that, we rst solve
for the policy functions relating di¤erent economic variables to the state
variables.
The dynamic economy evolves according to the following system of equa-
tions, where variables growing in the long run are normalized by human
capital, using the notation kt = Kt=Ht, ct = Ct=Ht and yt = Yt=Ht:
c t l
(1 )
t = c
 
t+1(Ahzt + 1  h) l(1 )t+1 (1 + rt+1); (50)
wt(1 + rt+1) = wt+1 [Ah(1  lt+1) + 1  h] ; (51)
ct =
(1   sw)(1   p)
(1 +  v)
wtlt; (52)
wt(1 + 
se) = (1  )Akt u t ; (53)
(1   s)

rt
1   g + k

+mt(   k)   c = (1   c)Ak 1t u1 t ; (54)
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yt = Ak

t u
1 
t ; (55)
lt + ut + zt = 1; (56)
(1  )yt = ct + kt+1(Ahzt + 1  h)  (1  k)kt; (57)
(1   g + rt+1)mt = (1   g) c + (1   g)(1  )mt+1: (58)
Note that during transition a constant share of government consumption of
output,  t = Yt is assumed in (57). Although there are four state variables
kt = Kt=Ht, kat = K
a
t =Ht, Bt=Ht and Et, the real economy given by equations
(50)(58) depends only on kt. The accounting capital does not a¤ect the
production decisions of the rm, and the evolution of kat is given once the time
path of kt is determined. The level of accounting capital only a¤ects the value
of the rm, which in turn a¤ects the nancial wealth of households. However,
all changes in the nancial wealth  bond holding and the value of equity 
are o¤set by changes in government transfers, Tt, leaving consumption and
time allocation decisions una¤ected.
Since the evolution of the economy depends on non-linear di¤erence equa-
tions (50), (51), and (58), we solve for the policy functions numerically. Fol-
lowing the methodology described in Judd (1992), we approximate the policy
functions for consumption c and the time allocated to work u, and variable
m as functions of capital:
c (k) =
Xn
i=1
'i(k)a
c
i , u (k) =
Xn
i=1
'i(k)a
u
i , m (k) =
Xn
i=1
'i(k)a
m
i
where 'i are Chebyshev polynomials and the coe¢ cients a
c
i , a
u
i , and a
m
i
are found using the orthogonal collocation method: the coe¢ cients are cho-
sen so that the system of equations (50)(58) is satised exactly for n dif-
ferent values of k; (kt)nt=1 are chosen to satisfy
Pn
t=1 'i(kt)'j(kt) = 0 for
i 6= j. Throughout we set n = 9 and choose the domain of approximation
2
3
kss; 4
3
kss

, where kss is the steady state K=H ratio. The choice of domain
ensures that one of Chebyshev nodes coincides with the steady state value,
kt = k
ss.
Using tax rates of Latvia in 2000, the consumption c, the time allocated
to work u; and the tax savings from depreciation, m; are given as functions
of capital k in Figure 1. The wage rate w, the time allocated to leisure l
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and to human capital production sector z, the interest rate r, investment
i and output y are given similarly in Figure 2. Figure 1 also shows the
approximation error for the policy functions c, u and m. With the physical
to human capital ratio above its steady state level, more of the output is
consumed and less is invested. Human capital accumulation is accelerated
by devoting more time to this sector in order to bring the economy to the
steady state. It not only decreases the time allocated to work but also to
leisure. The latter is compensated with increased consumption. A higher
capital stock and less time devoted to work imply that the wage is above
while the interest rate is below their respective steady state values. Since
m is inversely related to the interest rate, m exceeds its steady state value.
Note that the decrease in the work time more than o¤sets the higher-than-
steady-state value of the capital stock, leading to a lower output to human
capital ratio.7
A.2.1 Solving The Open Economy Model
The system of equations (50)(56) also describes the open economy equilib-
rium, while the resource constraint (57) needs to be modied to allow for the
international trade:
Yt = Ct + It +  t +Xt; (59)
where Xt denotes net exports. Given constant r, it follows from (23) that m
is also constant and given in (38). (Therefore, equation (58) is redundant.)
It is assumed that there is an unexpected and permanent change in tax rates
at the beginning of period 0. k0 has been already installed but other period
0 variables are still to be decided. Note that equation (54) is the rst order
condition with respect to the next period capital. Though u0 is exible, it
is not assumed that (54) holds in period 0. But it will hold from period 1
onwards, which implies that kt=ut is constant for t  1 and so is wt according
7When considering the other two countries and performing tax experiments, we must
again solve for the policy functions using new tax rates. Since the functions slope the same
way as the corresponding functions in Figures 1 and 2, we do not present them again. The
magnitudes of the error of approximation are also similar to those shown in Figure 1.
Note, however, when  = 0, m = 0 according to (23) and we only need to solve for c (k)
and u (k).
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Figure 2: Policy functions (continued)
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to (53). But then from (51), lt is constant starting period 2, which in turn
implies from (52) that ct is constant for t  2, from (50) that zt is constant
for t  2, and so on. That is, starting in period 2 the economy is in the steady
state. Further, although the real economy is in the steady state from period
2 onwards, some nancial variables will exhibit lengthy adjustment because
it still takes time for the accounting capital to adjust to its new steady state
value.
To solve for the equilibrium, rst a guess is made for k1 = K1=H1. Given
k0, k1 and the fact that starting in period 2 the economy is in the new steady
state, the rest of variables for periods 0 and 1 are recovered from equations
(50)-(56) and (59) (without invoking equation (54) for period 0.) Next, the
time path of nancial variables Bt, Vt, Dt, Kt and Tt is calculated. Fi-
nally, the intertemporal budget constraint of the consumer must be satised;
following Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1996, Section 2.5.1) this budget is given by
(1 + r)B0 + q1E0 +
 
1   dD0    g (q1E0   q0E0) (60)
+
1X
t=0
(1   p)(1   sw)wtutHt + Tt   (1 +  v)Ct
(1 + r)t
= 0:
A.3 Transitional Dynamics
Figures 3-5 show the transitional dynamics for each of the three Baltic coun-
tries in the closed economy model while gures 6-8 show the transitional
dynamics in the open economy model.
For Latvia, Figure 3 (the dotted line indicates the old steady state val-
ues) illustrates the transition of di¤erent variables to the new steady state
assuming that the economy was initially in the steady state corresponding
to the year 2000 tax rates. To move to its new steady state the agent must
increase accumulation of physical capital. Time allocated to work u is above
the steady state level, leading to higher-than-steady-state output y; lower
consumption c; and, consequently, higher investment. The accumulation of
human capital slows down due to a decrease in z; while lower consumption
is compensated by higher-than-steady-state leisure l. Note that, except for
period t = 0 when the tax rates change, during the transition period the
economy exhibits a lower growth rate of output Yt+1=Yt compared with the
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new steady state rate. Since the accounting capital stock is a fraction of the
physical capital stock, the increase in investment during transition causes
the accounting capital to overshoot its steady state ratio. As a result, the
value of the company and dividends to human capital also slightly overshoot
their long run ratios. Taking into account the transition, the present dis-
counted value of utility in Latvia isW (0;  2007) =  414:955, implying a gain
of  = 1:54% in consumption terms.
For Estonia, Figure 4 provides a transition pattern that is similar to
Latvias. Since the new steady state capital stock of 0.751 is above the old
steady state level of 0.726, the accumulation of physical capital is acceler-
ated. Work time u is above the new steady state level, leading to higher-
than-steady-state output. And since consumption c is below, it follows that
investment is above its new steady state level and the accumulation of physi-
cal capital is accelerated. Since the leisure time l is also above its new steady
state along the transition path, it follows that the time devoted to human
capital production z is below its new steady state value and the accumulation
of human capital is decelerated.
Figure 5 gives the Lithuanian transition dynamics to the new steady
state. Unlike the cases of Latvia and Estonia, the new steady state capital
stock of 0.418 is below the old steady state level of 0.435. Therefore, the
transition pattern is the opposite of those for the other two Baltic countries.
The accumulation of physical capital is decelerated while the accumulation
of human capital is accelerated by devoting less time to work u and more
time to human capital production z than in their new steady state levels.
This leads to higher-than-steady-state consumption but lower output and
investment. Higher consumption compensates for a lower-than-steady-state
value of leisure time l.
Note that the initial Lithuanian stock of accounting capital at the baseline
is ka = 0:2372; and  = 0:2 in equation (41); everywhere else  is set at  =
0. The rm keeps track of its accounting capital, although the depreciated
capital cannot decrease taxable prot and the level of accounting capital has
no e¤ect on the real economy.
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